|Abstract||Practical reasoning requires decision—making in the face of uncertainty. Xenelda has just left to go to work when she hears a burglar alarm. She doesn’t know whether it is hers but remembers that she left a window slightly open. Should she be worried? Her house may not be being burgled, since the wind or a power cut may have set the burglar alarm off, and even if it isn’t her alarm sounding she might conceivably be being burgled. Thus Xenelda can not be certain that her house is being burgled, and the decision that she takes must be based on her degree of certainty, together with the possible outcomes of that decision.|
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