Partem totius naturae esse: Spinoza's alternative to the mutual incomprehension of physicalism and mentalism in psychology

Spinoza’s account of human agency is presented as a solution to the fundamental dichotomy between physicalism and mentalism in psychology. It is argued that this dichotomy originates in the 17th century with the Cartesian and Hobbesian responses to the collapse of the Scholastic synthesis. Spinoza’s view of nature as equally Mind and Body, and his understanding of efficient causality as grounded in a self-caused natural totality are described. Spinozism’s relative lack of influence on contemporary scientific culture is attributed to his work having been marginalized during the 1st century after his death by political and religious authorities. Contemporary responses to the mentalist/physicalist dichotomy are discussed, as are trends in contemporary psychology that were foreshadowed by Spinoza’s observations. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords Spinoza   agency   naturalism   mentalism   physicalism   dichotomy   mind & body   contemporary psychology
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1037/a0015865
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 23,209
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Juan Comesaña (2005). We Are (Almost) All Externalists Now. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):59–76.
Colin R. Marshall (2009). The Mind and the Body as 'One and the Same Thing' in Spinoza. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 17 (5):897-919.
A. D. Smith (1993). Non-Reductive Physicalism? In Howard M. Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. Oxford University Press
Vasudevi Reddy (2005). Before the `Third Element': Understanding Attention to Self. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press 85--109.
Gideon Segal (2000). Beyond Subjectivity: Spinoza's Cognitivism of the Emotions. British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (1):1 – 19.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

5 ( #583,694 of 1,940,985 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #333,940 of 1,940,985 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.