Peirce versus Davidson on metaphorical meaning

Abstract
That a distinction can be drawn between the literal meaning of a metaphorical expression and its metaphorical meaning is assumed by a number of philosophical theories of metaphor, such as so-called comparison theories. These views descend from Aristotle and typically regard the metaphorical meaning of a metaphorical expression to be the literal meaning of a corresponding simile.1 “Man is a lion” literally means something that is clearly false, while “Man is a lion” metaphorically means something that may be true—man is like a lion. Max Black’s (1962) “interaction” theory also affirms the distinction and remains popular, including among some Peirce scholars whom I will discuss. But Donald Davidson has been ..
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