Graduate studies at Western
Philosophy of Science 71 (5):985-996 (2004)
|Abstract||For the greater part of the last 50 years, it has been common for philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists to invoke the notion of realization in discussing the relationship between the mind and the brain. In traditional philosophy of mind, mental states are said to be realized, instantiated, or implemented in brain states. Artificial intelligence is sometimes described as the attempt either to model or to actually construct systems that realize some of the same psychological abilities that we and other living creatures possess. The claim that specific psychological..|
|Keywords||Mechanism Metaphysics Mind Realization Science Craver, C Gillett, C|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett (2009). The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences. Mind and Language 24 (2):181-208.
Thomas W. Polger (2008). Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.
Robert A. Wilson (2001). Two Views of Realization. Philosophical Studies 104 (1):1-31.
Thomas W. Polger (2004). Neural Machinery and Realization. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):997-1006.
Ken Aizawa (2009). Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale. Synthese 167 (3):493 - 510.
Jacqueline Anne Sullivan (2010). Realization, Explanation and the Mind-Body Relation Editor's Introduction. Synthese 177 (2):151-164.
Carl Gillett (2003). The Metaphysics of Realization, Multiple Realizability, and the Special Sciences. Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):591-603.
Thomas W. Polger (2007). Realization and the Metaphysics of Mind. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):233 – 259.
Robert A. Wilson (2004). Realization: Metaphysics, Mind, and Science. Philosophy of Science 71 (5):985-996.
Carl F. Craver & Robert A. Wilson (2006). Realization. In P. Thagard (ed.), Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads40 ( #33,819 of 738,851 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,338 of 738,851 )
How can I increase my downloads?