David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press 137--159 (2009)
Two opposing tendencies in the philosophy of language go by the names of ‘referentialism’ and ‘inferentialism’ respectively. In the crudest version of the contrast, the referentialist account of meaning gives centre stage to the referential semantics for a language, which is then used to explain the inference rules for the language, perhaps as those which preserve truth on that semantics (since a referential semantics for a language determines the truth-conditions of its sentences). By contrast, the inferentialist account of meaning gives centre stage to the inference rules for the language, which are then used to explain its referential semantics, perhaps as the semantics on which the rules preserve truth. On pain of circularity, we cannot combine both directions of explanation.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Caj Strandberg (2015). Options for Hybrid Expressivism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (1):91-111.
Elisabeth Camp (2013). Slurring Perspectives. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):330-349.
Caj Strandberg (2012). A Dual Aspect Account of Moral Language. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):87-122.
Daniel Whiting (2013). It's Not What You Said, It's the Way You Said It: Slurs and Conventional Implicatures. Analytic Philosophy 54 (3):364-377.
Similar books and articles
Stefan Wintein (2012). Assertoric Semantics and the Computational Power of Self-Referential Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):317-345.
H. G. Callaway (1988). Semantic Competence and Truth-Conditional Semantics. Erkenntnis 28 (1):3 - 27.
Ray S. Jackendoff (1983). Semantics And Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Jay David Atlas (2005). Logic, Meaning, and Conversation: Semantical Underdeterminacy, Implicature, and Their Interface. Oxford University Press.
Claire Horisk (2007). The Expressive Role of Truth in Truth-Conditional Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):535–557.
Laura Schroeter, Two-Dimensional Semantics. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Alexis Burgess (2011). Mainstream Semantics + Deflationary Truth. Linguistics and Philosophy 34 (5):397-410.
Jeff Speaks (2006). Truth Theories, Translation Manuals, and Theories of Meaning. Linguistics and Philosophy 29 (4):487 - 505.
John MacFarlane (2010). Pragmatism and Inferentialism. In Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer (eds.), Reading Brandom: On Making It Explici. Routledge 81--95.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads161 ( #22,633 of 1,907,063 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #45,634 of 1,907,063 )
How can I increase my downloads?