Philosophy of Science 48 (1):1-18 (1981)
|Abstract||Accompanying the decline of empiricism in the theory of knowledge has been an increased interest in the social determinants of knowledge and an increased recognition of the fundamental place in the constitution of knowledge occupied by accepted cognitive practices. The principal aim of this paper is to show how a view of knowledge that fully recognizes the role of these practices can adequately treat a topic that is widely considered to be an insuperable obstacle to such a view. The topic is that of scientific realism, of the independence with respect to cognitive practices of certain objects of knowledge|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Nicholas Maxwell (1993). Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein Versus Van Fraassen: Part Two: Aim-Oriented Empiricism and Scientific Essentialism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (1):81-101.
André Kukla (1994). Scientific Realism, Scientific Practice, and the Natural Ontological Attitude. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (4):955-975.
Melinda Fagan, Social Epistemology of Scientific Inquiry: Beyond Historical Vs. Philosophical Case Studies.
Francis Remedios (2003). Fuller and Rouse on the Legitimation of Scientific Knowledge. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 33 (4):444-463.
Howard Sankey (2001). Scientific Realism: An Elaboration and a Defence. Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory 98 (98):35-54.
Tobin Nellhaus (2004). From Embodiment to Agency: Cognitive Science, Critical Realism and Communication Frameworks. Journal of Critical Realism 3 (1):103-132.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads18 ( #67,448 of 548,973 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,511 of 548,973 )
How can I increase my downloads?