Reason, social practice, and scientific realism

Philosophy of Science 48 (1):1-18 (1981)
Accompanying the decline of empiricism in the theory of knowledge has been an increased interest in the social determinants of knowledge and an increased recognition of the fundamental place in the constitution of knowledge occupied by accepted cognitive practices. The principal aim of this paper is to show how a view of knowledge that fully recognizes the role of these practices can adequately treat a topic that is widely considered to be an insuperable obstacle to such a view. The topic is that of scientific realism, of the independence with respect to cognitive practices of certain objects of knowledge
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    Roberto Frega (2013). The Practice-Based Approach to Normativity of Frederick L. Will. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 48 (4):483-511.
    Jarrett Leplin (1987). The Role of Experiment in Theory Construction. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 2 (1):72 – 83.
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