David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):945-953 (1997)
The core of Tony Brueckner’s critique in ‘Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism according to Williamson’ is his claim in section 5 that my account of perceptual knowledge has an unacceptable consequence. My reply will concentrate on that claim and largely ignore the rest of Brueckner’s interesting discussion, for it is easy to check that the claim is essential to Brueckner’s argument against my analysis of skepticism and evidence. The alleged consequence at issue concerns a case in which Brueckner knows by seeing that his cup is red. According to Brueckner, I am committed to the implausible view that ‘[his] belief of the proposition that [his] cup is red is justified in virtue of [his] belief of the proposition that [his] cup is red!’ Why does he take my account of..
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Michael V. Antony (2008). Are Our Concepts Conscious State and Conscious Creature Vague? Erkenntnis 68 (2):239-263.
Kit Fine (2008). The Impossibility of Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):111-136.
Stephen Kearns & Ofra Magidor (2008). Epistemicism About Vagueness and Meta-Linguistic Safety. Philosophical Perspectives 22 (1):277-304.
Michael V. Antony (2006). Vagueness and the Metaphysics of Consciousness. Philosophical Studies 128 (3):515-538.
Adam Sennet (2012). Semantic Plasticity and Epistemicism. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):273-285.
Similar books and articles
Anthony Brueckner (1993). One More Failed Transcendental Argument. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):633-636.
Dale Hample, Bing Han & David Payne (2010). The Aggressiveness of Playful Arguments. Argumentation 24 (4):405-421.
Anthony Brueckner (2005). Knowledge, Evidence, and Skepticism According to Williamson. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):436–443.
Paul Noordhof (2005). The Transmogrification of a Posteriori Knowledge: Reply to Brueckner. Analysis 65 (285):88-89.
Michael McKinsey (1994). Accepting the Consequences of Anti-Individualism. Analysis 54 (2):124-8.
H. M. Malm (1989). Commodification or Compensation: A Reply to Ketchum. Hypatia 4 (3):128-135.
Gary Ebbs (2001). Is Skepticism About Self-Knowledge Coherent? Philosophical Studies 105 (1):43-58.
J. L. Schellenberg (2005). The Hiddenness Argument Revisited. Religious Studies 41 (3):287-303.
Timothy Williamson (2005). Replies to Commentators. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):468–491.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads240 ( #10,413 of 1,906,979 )
Recent downloads (6 months)49 ( #12,167 of 1,906,979 )
How can I increase my downloads?