David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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1. As John Hawthorne and Maria Lasonen-Aarnio appreciate, some of the central issues raised in their ‘Knowledge and Objective Chance’ arise for all but the most extreme theories of knowledge. In a wide range of cases, according to very plausible everyday judgments, we know something about the future, even though, according to quantum mechanics, our belief has a small but nonzero chance (objective probability) of being untrue. In easily constructed examples, we are in that position simultaneously with respect to many different propositions about the future that are equiprobable and probabilistically independent of each other, at least to a reasonable approximation.
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Timothy Williamson (2014). Very Improbable Knowing. Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.
Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre (2013). Epistemic Closure Under Deductive Inference: What is It and Can We Afford It? Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.
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