Realizing what might be

Philosophical Studies 153 (3):365 - 375 (2011)
Schulz has shown that the suppositional view of indicative conditionals leads to a corresponding view of epistemic modals. But his case backfires: the resulting theory of epistemic modals gets the facts wrong, and so we end up with a good argument against the suppositional view. I show how and why a dynamic view of indicative conditionals leads to a better theory of epistemic modals
Keywords Epistemic modals  Indicative conditionals  Dynamic semantics  Suppositional view
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DOI 10.2307/41487639
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