David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Law and Philosophy 31 (2):125-159 (2012)
This paper argues that, if we are committed to a Pro-choice stance with regard to selective abortion for disability, we will be unable to justify the prohibition of sex-selective abortion (SSA), for two reasons. First, familiar Pro-choice arguments in favour of a woman’s right to select against fetal impairment also support, by parity of reasoning, a right to choose SSA. Second, rejection of the criticisms of selective abortion for disability levelled by disability theorists also disposes, by implication, of the key objections to SSA, as developed, most notably, by feminists. The paper, then, consists of a conditional defence of SSA, under which SSA should be available, and protected by a right, if selective abortion for disability is. Opponents of SSA might respond by conceding additional restrictions on selection against disabled fetuses. It should become clear throughout the paper, however, that any such new restrictions would be unacceptably onerous for women
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References found in this work BETA
Allen E. Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman Daniels & Daniel Wikler (2000). From Chance to Choice. Cambridge University Press.
David Enoch & Andrei Marmor (2007). The Case Against Moral Luck. Law and Philosophy 26 (4):405-436.
P. Jones (1999). Group Rights and Group Oppression. Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (4):353–377.
F. M. Kamm (2007/2008). Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm. New York ;Oxford University Press.
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