Supposition and desire in a non-classical setting

Revising semantics and logic has consequences for the theory of mind. Standard formal treatments of rational belief and desire make classical assumptions. If we are to challenge the presuppositions, we indicate what is kind of theory is going to take their place. Consider probability theory interpreted as an account of ideal partial belief. But if some propositions are neither true nor false, or are half true, or whatever—then it’s far from clear that our degrees of belief in it and its negation should sum to 1, as classical probability theory requires (?, cf.). There are extant proposals in the literature for generalizing (categorical) probability theory to a non-classical setting, and we will use these below. But subjective probabilities themselves stand in functional relations to other mental states, and we need to trace the knock-on consequences of revisionism for this interrelationship (arguably, degrees of belief only count as kinds of belief in virtue of standing in these functional relationships)
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index Translate to english
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,879
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Keith Frankish (2009). Partial Belief and Flat-Out Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer 75--93.
James Hawthorne (2009). The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer 49--74.
Nicholas J. J. Smith (2009). Degree of Belief is Expected Truth Value. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press 491--506.
Seungbae Park (2013). Against the Besire Theory of Moral Judgment. Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (1):5-17.
Brian Weatherson (2003). From Classical to Intuitionistic Probability. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 44 (2):111-123.
Franz Huber (2009). Belief and Degrees of Belief. In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

19 ( #144,871 of 1,725,162 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

15 ( #48,693 of 1,725,162 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.