David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Revising semantics and logic has consequences for the theory of mind. Standard formal treatments of rational belief and desire make classical assumptions. If we are to challenge the presuppositions, we indicate what is kind of theory is going to take their place. Consider probability theory interpreted as an account of ideal partial belief. But if some propositions are neither true nor false, or are half true, or whatever—then it’s far from clear that our degrees of belief in it and its negation should sum to 1, as classical probability theory requires (?, cf.). There are extant proposals in the literature for generalizing (categorical) probability theory to a non-classical setting, and we will use these below. But subjective probabilities themselves stand in functional relations to other mental states, and we need to trace the knock-on consequences of revisionism for this interrelationship (arguably, degrees of belief only count as kinds of belief in virtue of standing in these functional relationships)
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