David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Noûs 39 (3):426-459 (2005)
The physicalist thesis that all entities are nothing over and above physical entities is often interpreted as appealing to a supervenience-based account of "nothing over and aboveness”, where, schematically, the A-entities are nothing over and above the B-entities if the A-entities supervene on the B-entities. The main approaches to filling in this schema correspond to different ways of characterizing the modal strength, the supervenience base, or the supervenience connection at issue. I consider each approach in turn, and argue that the resulting formulation of physicalism is compatible with physicalism’s best traditional rival: a naturalist emergentism. Others have argued that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism fail. My aim here, besides addressing the full spectrum of supervenience-based approaches, is to show how certain philosophical and scientific theses concerning naturalism, properties, and laws give us new reasons to think that supervenience-based formulations of physicalism are untenable.
|Keywords||Emergentism Metaphysics Necessity Physicalism Properties Supervenience|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
D. M. Armstrong (1989). A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility. Cambridge University Press.
David Bohm (1957/1999). Causality and Chance in Modern Physics. University of Pennsylvania Press.
C. D. Broad (1925). The Mind and its Place in Nature. Routledge and Kegan Paul.
James Van Cleve (1990). Mind--Dust or Magic? Panpsychism Versus Emergence. Philosophical Perspectives 4:215 - 226.
Tim Crane & D. H. Mellor (1990). There is No Question of Physicalism. Mind 99 (394):185-206.
Citations of this work BETA
Jessica M. Wilson (2010). What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
Jessica M. Wilson (2010). Non-Reductive Physicalism and Degrees of Freedom. British Journal for Philosophy of Science 61 (2):279-311.
Thomas W. Polger (2011). Are Sensations Still Brain Processes? Philosophical Psychology 24 (1):1-21.
Stephen Biggs (2011). Abduction and Modality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):283-326.
Janice Dowell, J. L. (2006). The Physical: Empirical, Not Metaphysical. Philosophical Studies 131 (1):25-60.
Similar books and articles
Andrew R. Bailey (1998). Supervenience and Physicalism. Synthese 117 (1):53-73.
Erhan Demircioglu (2011). Supervenience and Reductive Physicalism. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7 (1):25-35.
Andrew Melnyk (1991). Physicalism: From Supervenience to Elimination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (September):573-87.
Robert J. Howell (2009). Emergentism and Supervenience Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):83 – 98.
Robert Kirk (1996). Strict Implication, Supervenience, and Physicalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):244-57.
Robin Brown & James Ladyman (2009). Physicalism, Supervenience and the Fundamental Level. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234):20-38.
Warren Shrader (2008). On the Relevance of Supervenience Theses to Physicalism. Acta Analytica 23 (3):257-271.
Thomas Gardner (2005). Supervenience Physicalism: Meeting the Demands of Determination and Explanation. Philosophical Papers 34 (2):189-208.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads166 ( #4,814 of 1,102,112 )
Recent downloads (6 months)22 ( #9,310 of 1,102,112 )
How can I increase my downloads?