David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Erkenntnis 37 (3):281 - 308 (1992)
Semantic Indeterminacy and Scientific Realism are perhaps the two most ubiquitous and influential doctrines of the Quinean corpus. My concern is to argue against neither in isolation, but against their joint compatibility. Scientific Realism, I argue, when understood as Quine's realistic attitude toward the posits of physical theory, is essentially intentional in character. Thus, Realism requires Intentionality. In Section 1, I provide some necessary exegesis. In Section 2, I attempt to show how this Realism/Intentionality connection arises, surprisingly, within Quine's own mature work to create a tension in his views which he does not himself resolve. In Section 3, I examine the source of the Realism/Intentionality connection more deeply, and respond to possible Quinean objections to my account. In Section 4, I consider the consequences of the connection for various debates in recent analytic philosophy.
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References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
W. V. Quine (1953/1980). From a Logical Point of View. Harvard University Press.
Willard V. O. Quine (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Michael Devitt (1991). Realism and Truth. B. Blackwell.
W. V. Quine (1974/1973). The Roots of Reference. Lasalle, Ill.,Open Court.
Citations of this work BETA
Christian Nimtz (2005). Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy. Erkenntnis 62 (1):1 - 28.
Christian Nimtz (2005). Reassessing Referential Indeterminacy. Erkenntnis 62 (1):1-28.
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