Online research in philosophy

This Article describes the emergence and operation of a powerful type of social norm which is not only ingrained into the very fabric of society, but is also accepted and internalized by a high percentage of populations all over the world. This type of norm is termed a quasi-global social norm. This Article introduces quasi-global social norms by giving an account of their origin and development. Quasi-global social norms are shown to originate as a result of the sociological necessity that individuals have to rely upon one another for survival and self-betterment. This instinctual reliance causes these norms to penetrate deep into the subconscious of individuals and contributes to their almost universal adherence. Their development and enforcement is contingent on their internalization by large segments of society. Thus, quasi-global social norms tend to be abstract behavioral guidelines rather than specific rules of conduct, and to substantively relate to notions of fundamental import such as liberty and fairness. This Article continues by showing that the personal interactions that sustain quasi-global social norms are both continuous and pervasive, so much so that they seep into the legal system which, to be effective, must adapt itself to the prevailing quasi-global social norms. This Article concludes by reviewing two U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, which illustrate how and when quasi-global social norms inform contemporary social and legal behavior.

The purpose of the present paper is to develop and defend an account of narrow content that would neutralize the commonplace charge that narrow content.

Narrow mental content is a kind of mental content that does not depend on an individual's environment. Narrow content contrasts with “broad” or “wide” content, which depends on features of the individual's environment as well as on features of the individual. It is controversial whether there is any such thing as narrow content. Assuming that there is, it is also controversial what sort of content it is, what its relation to ordinary or “broad” content is, and how it is determined by the individual's intrinsic properties.

A commonplace in contemporary philosophy is that mental content has normative properties. A number of writers associate this view to the idea that the normativity of content is essentially connected to its social character. I agree with the first thesis, but disagree with the second. The paper examines three kinds of views according to which the norms of thought and content are social: Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Davidson’s triangulation argument, and Brandom’s inferential pragmatics, and criticises each. It is argued that there are objective conceptual norms constitutive of mental content, but that these are not essentially social.