In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press (2006)
|Abstract||0. Logic is sometimes conceived as metaphysically neutral, so that nothing controversial in metaphysics is logically valid. That conception devastates logic. Just about every putative principle of logic has been contested on metaphysical grounds. According to some, future contingencies violate the law of excluded middle; according to others, the set of all sets that are not members of themselves makes a contradiction true. Even the structural principle that chaining together valid arguments yields a valid argument has been rejected in response to sorites paradoxes. In each case, a deviant metaphysics corresponds to the deviant logic. Of course, if one is trying to persuade deviant metaphysicians of the error of their ways, one is unlikely to get far by relying on logical principles that they reject. But that obvious dialectical exigency stably marks out no realm of logic. Each logical principle has persuasive force in some dialectical contexts and not in others. We do better to admit that logic has metaphysically contentious implications, and embrace them ─ if we know what they are.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Susan Haack (1996). Deviant Logic, Fuzzy Logic: Beyond the Formalism. University of Chicago Press.
Venanzio Raspa (1999). Łukasiewicz on the Principle of Contradiction. Journal of Philosophical Research 24:57-112.
Timothy Williamson (forthcoming). Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality. Erkenntnis:1-21.
Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.) (2006). Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press.
Nicola Ciprotti & Luca Moretti (2009). Logical Pluralism is Compatible with Monism About Metaphysical Modality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):275-284.
Greg Restall (1993). Deviant Logic and the Paradoxes of Self Reference. Philosophical Studies 70 (3):279 - 303.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads24 ( #51,719 of 549,754 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,754 )
How can I increase my downloads?