David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 14 (2):141-153 (2001)
The theory-theory claims that the explanation and prediction of behavior works via the application of a theory, while the simulation theory claims that explanation works by putting ourselves in others' places and noting what we would do. On either account, in order to develop a prediction or explanation of another person's behavior, one first needs to have a characterization of that person's current or recent actions. Simulation requires that I have some grasp of the other person's behavior to project myself upon; whereas theorizing requires a subject matter to theorize about. The frame problem shows that multiple, true characterizations are possible for any behavior or situation. However, only one or a few of these characterizations are relevant to explaining or predicting behavior. Since different characterizations of a behavior lead to different predictions or explanations, much of the work of interpersonal interpretation is done in the process of finding this characterization - that is, prior to either theorizing or simulating. Moreover, finding this characterization involves extensive knowledge of the physical, cultural, and social worlds of the persons involved.
|Keywords||Application Behavior Frame Person Psychology Science Simulation|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Derek W. Strijbos & Leon C. de Bruin (2011). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.
Leon de Bruin & Derek Strijbos (2010). Folk Psychology Without Principles: An Alternative to the Belief-Desire Model of Action Interpretation. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):257-274.
Similar books and articles
John Michael, Simulation as an Epistemic Tool Between Theory and Practice: A Comparison of the Relationship Between Theory and Simulation in Science and Folk Psychology. EPSA07.
Paul M. Churchland (1988). Folk Psychology and the Explanation of Human Behavior. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 62:209-21.
Robert M. Gordon & Joe Cruz (2002). Simulation Theory. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
Shaun Gallagher (2001). The Practice of Mind: Theory, Simulation or Primary Interaction? Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7):83-108.
Martin Davies & Tony Stone (2001). Mental Simulation, Tacit Theory, and the Threat of Collapse. Philosophical Topics 29 (1-2):127-73.
Shaun Nichols, Stephen P. Stich, Alan M. Leslie & David B. Klein (1996). Varieties of Off-Line Simulation. In Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Cambridge University Press. 39-74.
Russell Trenholme (1994). Analog Simulation. Philosophy of Science 61 (1):115-131.
Kristin Andrews (2003). Knowing Mental States: The Asymmetry of Psychological Prediction and Explanation. In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
Alan M. Leslie, Shaun Nichols, Stephen P. Stich & David B. Klein (1996). Varieties of Off-Line Simulation. In P. Carruthers & P. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press. 39-74.
Justin C. Fisher (2006). Does Simulation Theory Really Involve Simulation? Philosophical Psychology 19 (4):417 – 432.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads55 ( #41,247 of 1,696,562 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #79,846 of 1,696,562 )
How can I increase my downloads?