Transhumanism and moral equality

Bioethics 21 (8):419–425 (2007)
Abstract
Conservative thinkers such as Francis Fukuyama have produced a battery of objections to the transhumanist project of fundamentally enhancing human capacities. This article examines one of these objections, namely that by allowing some to greatly extend their capacities, we will undermine the fundamental moral equality of human beings. I argue that this objection is groundless: once we understand the basis for human equality, it is clear that anyone who now has sufficient capacities to count as a person from the moral point of view will continue to count as one even if others are fundamentally enhanced; and it is mistaken to think that a creature which had even far greater capacities than an unenhanced human being should count as more than an equal from the moral point of view.
Keywords Kant  transhumanism  moral equality  enhancement  Singer problem  Francis Fukuyama  John Rawls
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References found in this work BETA
Laurence Thomas (2005). Moral Equality and Natural Inferiority. Social Theory and Practice 31 (3):379-404.
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