Tennant on knowable truth

Ratio 13 (2):99–114 (2000)
The paper responds to Neil Tennant's recent discussion of Fitch's so-called paradox of knowability in the context of intuitionistic logic. Tennant's criticisms of the author's earlier work on this topic are shown to rest on a principle about the assertability of disjunctions with the absurd consequence that everything we could make true already is true. Tennant restricts the anti-realist principle that truth implies knowability in order to escape Fitch's argument, but a more complex variant of the argument is shown to elicit from his restricted principle exactly the consequences which it was intended to avoid
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9329.00113
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