David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ratio 13 (2):99–114 (2000)
The paper responds to Neil Tennant's recent discussion of Fitch's so-called paradox of knowability in the context of intuitionistic logic. Tennant's criticisms of the author's earlier work on this topic are shown to rest on a principle about the assertability of disjunctions with the absurd consequence that everything we could make true already is true. Tennant restricts the anti-realist principle that truth implies knowability in order to escape Fitch's argument, but a more complex variant of the argument is shown to elicit from his restricted principle exactly the consequences which it was intended to avoid
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Citations of this work BETA
Joe Salerno (2010). Introduction to Knowability and Beyond. Synthese 173 (1):1-8.
Igor Douven (2007). Fitch's Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism. Studia Logica 86 (2):149 - 182.
Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu (2013). Discovering Knowability: A Semantic Analysis. Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
Neil Tennant (2010). Williamson's Woes. Synthese 173 (1):9 - 23.
Rafał Palczewski (2007). Distributed Knowability and Fitch's Paradox. Studia Logica 86 (3):455--478.
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Greg Restall (2009). Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at Least, Not All at Once). In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press 339--354.
Neil Tennant (2001). Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Williamson. Ratio 14 (3):263–280.
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N. Tennant (2001). Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Hand and Kvanvig. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):107 – 113.
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