The possibility of onion worlds: Rebutting an argument for structural universals

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):193 – 203 (2007)
Abstract
Some argue that theories of universals should incorporate structural universals, in order to allow for the metaphysical possibility of worlds of 'infinite descending complexity' ('onion worlds'). I argue that the possibility of such worlds does not establish the need for structural universals. So long as we admit the metaphysical possibility of emergent universals, there is an attractive alternative description of such cases.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,986
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Peter Forrest (1986). Ways Worlds Could Be. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):15 – 24.
Eli Hirsch (1993). Dividing Reality. Oxford University Press.

View all 10 references

Citations of this work BETA
Katherine Hawley (2010). Mereology, Modality and Magic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):117 – 133.
Sam Cowling (2014). Instantiation as Location. Philosophical Studies 167 (3):667-682.
Similar books and articles
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-01-28

Total downloads

47 ( #34,847 of 1,101,021 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #81,070 of 1,101,021 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.