The possibility of onion worlds: Rebutting an argument for structural universals

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):193 – 203 (2007)
Some argue that theories of universals should incorporate structural universals, in order to allow for the metaphysical possibility of worlds of 'infinite descending complexity' ('onion worlds'). I argue that the possibility of such worlds does not establish the need for structural universals. So long as we admit the metaphysical possibility of emergent universals, there is an attractive alternative description of such cases.
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Forrest (1986). Ways Worlds Could Be. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64 (1):15 – 24.
Eli Hirsch (1993). Dividing Reality. Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
J. R. G. Williams (2006). Illusions of Gunk. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):493–513.
Katherine Hawley (2010). Mereology, Modality and Magic. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):117 – 133.

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