The Problem of Realism in the Philosophy of Charles Taylor and an Existential Thomist Proposal

This paper attempts to show that Charles Taylor’s persuasive and expansive phenomenology, developed primarily in his Sources of the Self, ultimately depends upon an ontology of the human person that remains undeveloped, as he often admits. His fundamentalphilosophical claims stand finally as postulates of practical reason, which nevertheless depend upon a dialogical practice that is grounded in the dialogical nature of the human person. This phenomenological and ethical approach raises persistent epistemological and metaphysical questions. What Taylor does not admit, and what this paper will propose in his stead, is that a more systematic metaphysics in the existential Thomist tradition can help support philosophically both his explicit and implicit ontological claims regarding the nature of the human person
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
DOI 10.5840/ipq20105017
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,121
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Neil Levy (2000). Charles Taylor on Overcoming Incommensurability. Philosophy and Social Criticism 26 (5):47-61.
James B. Sauer (1997). Language, Meaning, and Ethics. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 4 (1/2):48-55.

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

24 ( #168,526 of 1,934,702 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #269,464 of 1,934,702 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.