David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):83-100 (2010)
Mutual perceptual knowledge is a prevalent feature of our everyday lives, yet appears to be exceptionally difficult to characterise in an acceptable way. This paper argues for a renewed understanding of Stephen Schiffer’s iterative approach to mutual knowledge, according to which mutual knowledge requires an infinite number of overlapping, embedded mental states. It is argued that the charge of ‘psychological implausibility’ that normally accompanies discussion of this approach can be offset by identifying mutual knowledge, not with the infinite iterations themselves, but with the finite base which Schiffer proves is capable of generating those iterations. An understanding of this finite base as a primitive, relational property holding between two or more people, allows us to understand the iterations as an implicit and ‘harmless’ intrapersonal feature of what is an interpersonal phenomenon. The paper concludes by relating the account to joint attention in infant interaction.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.
A. Goldman (2006/2008). Simulating Minds: The Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience of Mindreading. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Cedric Paternotte (2013). The Epistemic Core of Weak Joint Action. Philosophical Psychology (1):1-24.
Michael Wilby (2012). Embodying the False-Belief Tasks. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (4):519-540.
Similar books and articles
Kenneth R. Westphal (2011). ‘Urteilskraft, Gegenseitige Anerkennung Und Rationale Rechtfertigung’. In Hans-Dieter Klein (ed.), Ethik Als Prima Philosophia? Königshausen & Neumann
Thomas Fuchs & Hanne de Jaegher (2009). Enactive Intersubjectivity: Participatory Sense-Making and Mutual Incorporation. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):465-486.
Peter C. Cramton (1995). Deception and Mutual Trust. Business Ethics Quarterly 5 (4):823-832.
Gurpreet Rattan (2006). The Knowledge in Language. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):505-521.
Fernando Broncano (2008). Trusting Others. The Epistemological Authority of Testimony. Theoria 23 (1):11-22.
Joel Smith (2006). Review of Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (Eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1126-9.
G.�Nter K.�Ppers (1999). Coping with Uncertainty: New Forms of Knowledge Production. [REVIEW] AI and Society 13 (1-2):52-62.
Vasudevi Reddy (2005). Before the `Third Element': Understanding Attention to Self. In Naomi Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford University Press 85--109.
Christopher Peacocke (2005). Joint Attention: Its Nature, Reflexivity, and Relation to Common Knowledge. In Naomi M. Eilan, Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Johannes Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: Communication and Other Minds. Oxford University Press 298.
Added to index2010-08-11
Total downloads95 ( #42,508 of 1,796,172 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #468,533 of 1,796,172 )
How can I increase my downloads?