David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Joe Salerno (ed.), New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford University Press. 183--204 (2009)
First, some reminiscences. In the years 1973-80, when I was an undergraduate and then graduate student at Oxford, Michael Dummett’s formidable and creative philosophical presence made his arguments impossible to ignore. In consequence, one pole of discussion was always a form of anti-realism. It endorsed something like the replacement of truth-conditional semantics by verification-conditional semantics and of classical logic by intuitionistic logic, and the principle that all truths are knowable. It did not endorse the principle that all truths are known. Nor did it mention the now celebrated argument, first published by Frederic Fitch (1963), that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known.
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Citations of this work BETA
Joe Salerno (2010). Introduction to Knowability and Beyond. Synthese 173 (1):1-8.
Julien Murzi (2012). Manifestability and Epistemic Truth. Topoi 31 (1):17-26.
Martin Fischer (2013). Some Remarks on Restricting the Knowability Principle. Synthese 190 (1):63-88.
Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu (2013). Discovering Knowability: A Semantic Analysis. Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
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