Wide computationalism

Mind 103 (411):351-72 (1994)
Abstract
The computational argument for individualism, which moves from computationalism to individualism about the mind, is problematic, not because computationalism is false, but because computational psychology is, at least sometimes, wide. The paper provides an early, or perhaps predecessor, version of the thesis of extended cognition.
Keywords Cognitive  Computationalism  Formalism  Individual  Logic
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DOI 10.1093/mind/103.411.351
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Kim Sterelny (2010). Minds: Extended or Scaffolded? [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (4):465-481.
Andy Clark (2006). Material Symbols. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):291-307.

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