Why contingent identity is necessary

Philosophical Studies 43 (3):301 - 327 (1983)
This paper argues that the principle of necessary identity (f)(g)(f=g then necessarily f=g) cannot be maintained, At least in second order form. A paradox based upon scientific definitional practice is introduced to demonstrate this. A non-Fregean reading of standard contingent identity semantics is provided to explain how such 'definition breaking' works
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372368
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References found in this work BETA
Saul Kripke (2010). Naming and Necessity. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge 431-433.
Saul A. Kripke (1963). Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica 16 (1963):83-94.

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