David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supp 30:407-425 (2005)
Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In _The Mind Doesn't Work That Way_, Fodor has developed the dark message of _The Modularity of Mind_ regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent empirical developments in the cognitive sciences in assessing Fodor's position
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
William Marslen-Wilson & Lorraine Komisarjevsky Tyler (1987). Against Modularity. In Modularity In Knowledge Representation And Natural- Language Understanding. Cambridge: Mit Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1986). The Modularity of Mind. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), Meaning and Cognitive Structure. Ablex.
Robert A. Wilson (2008). What Computers (Still, Still) Can't Do: Jerry Fodor on Computation and Modularity. In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), New Essays in Philosophy of Language and Mind.
Daniel A. Weiskopf (2002). On Fodor's The Mind Doesn't Work That Way. Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551-562.
John M. Collins (2005). On the Input Problem for Massive Modularity. Minds and Machines 15 (1):1-22.
Daniel Weiskopf (2002). A Critical Review of Jerry A. Fodor's the Mind Doesn't Work That Way. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 15 (4):551 – 562.
S. Okasha (2003). Fodor on Cognition, Modularity, and Adaptationism. Philosophy of Science 70 (1):68-88.
Jesse J. Prinz (2006). Is the Mind Really Modular? In Robert J. Stainton (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science. Blackwell. 22--36.
Steven Pinker (2005). A Reply to Jerry Fodor on How the Mind Works. Mind and Language 20 (1):33-38.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads51 ( #32,333 of 1,102,807 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #120,475 of 1,102,807 )
How can I increase my downloads?