David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (11-12):145-176 (2000)
Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross-cultural literature search on the ‘mind’ side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self . A ‘master template’ of these various phenomena, culled from over one-hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the ‘mind’ side of the brain-mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the ‘hard problem', or how the mind-side can be integrated with the brain-side to result a more integral theory of consciousness
|Keywords||Consciousness Mental Metaphysics Self State Stream Wave|
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