David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Episteme 4 (1):93-114 (2007)
This article distinguishes Wittgensteinian contextualism from epistemic relativism. The latter involves the view that a belief ’s status as justified depends on the believer’s epistemic system, as well as the view that no system is superior to another. It emerges from the thought that we must rely, circularly, on our epistemic system to determine whether any belief is justified. Contextualism, by contrast, emerges from the thought that we need not answer a skeptical challenge to a belief unless there is good reason to doubt the belief; so we need not rely on our epistemic system to determine whether a belief is justified. Accordingly contextualism is not committed to the view that a belief ’s status depends on the believer’s epistemic system, nor to the view that no system is superior to another. The contextualist is not committed to epistemic relativism
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References found in this work BETA
R. Rorty (1981). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton University Press.
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1969/1991). On Certainty (Ed. Anscombe and von Wright). Harper Torchbooks.
Michael Williams (2001). Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology. OUP Oxford.
Roderick M. Chisholm (1982). The Foundations of Knowing. Univ of Minnesota Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Markus Seidel (2013). Why the Epistemic Relativist Cannot Use the Sceptic's Strategy. A Comment on Sankey. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):134-139.
Duncan Pritchard (2012). Wittgenstein and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. Synthese 189 (2):255-272.
Howard Sankey (2015). Scepticism, Relativism and a Naturalistic Particularism. Social Epistemology 29 (4):395-412.
Natalie Alana Ashton (2015). Undercutting Underdetermination‐Based Scepticism. Theoria 81 (4):333-354.
Martin Kusch (forthcoming). Relativism in Feyerabend's Later Writings. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A.
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