What is moral judgment?

Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):321-49 (2007)
Moral knowledge appears to require moral judgments to be states of belief, yet they must at the same time be states of desire and feeling if they embody the motivation that we feel when we make moral judgments. How can the same judgment be a state of belief and a state of desire or feeling, simultaneously? [...] This problem may be resolved, I shall contend, by understanding moral judgments to be complex, multifunctional states that normally comprise both states of belief that represent possible moral truths and states of emotion and motivation.
Keywords moral judgment  hybrid theory  cognitivism  expressivism
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DOI jphil2007104716
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Victor Kumar (2015). Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.
Victor Kumar (2011). In Support of Anti-Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.

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