David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Journal of Philosophy 104 (7):321-49 (2007)
Moral knowledge appears to require moral judgments to be states of belief, yet they must at the same time be states of desire and feeling if they embody the motivation that we feel when we make moral judgments. How can the same judgment be a state of belief and a state of desire or feeling, simultaneously? [...] This problem may be resolved, I shall contend, by understanding moral judgments to be complex, multifunctional states that normally comprise both states of belief that represent possible moral truths and states of emotion and motivation.
|Keywords||moral judgment hybrid theory cognitivism expressivism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Victor Kumar (2015). Moral Judgment as a Natural Kind. Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2887-2910.
Victor Kumar (2011). In Support of Anti-Intellectualism. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):135-54.
Victor Kumar & Richmond Campbell (forthcoming). Honor and Moral Revolution. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-13.
Richmond Campbell (2013). Reflective Equilibrium and Moral Consistency Reasoning. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):1-19.
Similar books and articles
Matthew S. Bedke (2009). Moral Judgment Purposivism: Saving Internalism From Amoralism. Philosophical Studies 144 (2):189 - 209.
Jacqueline L. Reck (2000). Ethics and Budget Allocation Decisions of Municipal Budget Officers. Journal of Business Ethics 27 (4):335 - 350.
Ryan J. Hay (2013). Hybrid Expressivism and the Analogy Between Pejoratives and Moral Language. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):450-474.
Kyle Swan (2004). Moral Judgment and Emotions. Journal of Value Inquiry 38 (3):375-381.
Kenneth R. Westphal (2012). ‘Norm Acquisition, Rational Judgment and Moral Particularism’. Theory and Research in Education 10 (1):3--25.
Andrew Sneddon (2007). A Social Model of Moral Dumbfounding: Implications for Studying Moral Reasoning and Moral Judgment. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):731 – 748.
Alice Crary (2007). Beyond Moral Judgment. Harvard University Press.
Kathleen Wallace (1993). Reconstructing Judgment: Emotion and Moral Judgment. Hypatia 8 (3):61 - 83.
Toby Svoboda (2011). Hybridizing Moral Expressivism and Moral Error Theory. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):37-48.
Added to index2009-11-17
Total downloads144 ( #25,501 of 1,796,328 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #97,568 of 1,796,328 )
How can I increase my downloads?