David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 64 (4):372-84 (1997)
Most philosophical accounts of emergence are incompatible with reduction. Most scientists regard a system property as emergent relative to properties of the system's parts if it depends upon their mode of organization--a view consistent with reduction. Emergence can be analyzed as a failure of aggregativity--a state in which "the whole is nothing more than the sum of its parts." Aggregativity requires four conditions, giving tools for analyzing modes of organization. Differently met for different decompositions of the system, and in different degrees, these conditions provide powerful evaluation criteria for choosing decompositions, and heuristics for detecting biases of vulgar reductionisms. This analysis of emergence is compatible with reduction
|Keywords||Artificial Emergence Heuristics Life Reduction Science|
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Massimo Pigliucci (2012). On the Different Ways of ‘‘Doing Theory’’ in Biology. Biological Theory 7 (4):DOI 10.1007/s13752-012-0047-1.
Richard Campbell & Mark H. Bickhard (2011). Physicalism, Emergence and Downward Causation. Axiomathes 21 (1):33-56.
Jason Megill (2013). A Defense of Emergence. Axiomathes 23 (4):597-615.
Arno G. Wouters (2007). Design Explanation: Determining the Constraints on What Can Be Alive. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 67 (1):65-80.
Johanna Seibt (2009). Forms of Emergent Interaction in General Process Theory. Synthese 166 (3):479 - 512.
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