David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):317-345 (2012)
There is no consensus as to whether a Liar sentence is meaningful or not. Still, a widespread conviction with respect to Liar sentences (and other ungrounded sentences) is that, whether or not they are meaningful, they are useless . The philosophical contribution of this paper is to put this conviction into question. Using the framework of assertoric semantics , which is a semantic valuation method for languages of self-referential truth that has been developed by the author, we show that certain computational problems, called query structures , can be solved more efficiently by an agent who has self-referential resources (amongst which are Liar sentences) than by an agent who has only classical resources; we establish the computational power of self-referential truth . The paper concludes with some thoughts on the implications of the established result for deflationary accounts of truth
|Keywords||Liar paradox self reference assertoric semantics self-referential truth query structures computational power computation inferential semantics information retrieval|
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Citations of this work BETA
Stefan Wintein (2013). On the Strict–Tolerant Conception of Truth. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (1):1-20.
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