Law Without Legitimacy or Justification? The Flawed Foundations of Philosophical Anarchism

Res Publica 18 (2):173-188 (2012)
In this article, I examine A. John Simmons’s philosophical anarchism, and specifically, the problems that result from the combination of its three foundational principles: the strong correlativity of legitimacy rights and political obligations; the strict distinction between justified existence and legitimate authority; and the doctrine of personal consent, more precisely, its supporting assumptions about the natural freedom of individuals and the non-natural states into which individuals are born. As I argue, these assumptions, when combined with the strong correlativity and strict distinction theses, undermine Simmons’s claim, which is central to his philosophical anarchism, that a state may be justified in enforcing the law, even if illegitimate or unjustified in existing
Keywords A. John Simmons  Philosophical anarchism  Political obligation  Rights and obligations  Justification and legitimacy
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DOI 10.1007/s11158-011-9175-x
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Robert Paul Wolff (1971). In Defense of Anarchism. Journal of Philosophy 68 (18):561-567.
A. John Simmons (1992). The Lockean Theory of Rights. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).

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