Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (1):88-101 (2009)
|Abstract||abstract Ryle's claim that knowing how is distinct from knowing that is defended from critics like Stanley and Williamson and Snowdon. However, the way in which Ryle himself deploys this distinction is problematic. By effectively dismissing the idea that systematic propositional knowledge has a significant bearing on knowledge how, Ryle implicitly supports a view of vocational education that favours narrow notions of skill and associated training over knowledge informed occupational practice of the kind found in most Northern European countries. The source of Ryle's error in excluding systematic propositional knowledge from a significant place in the constitution of knowing how is traced. It is argued that Ryle's original distinction survives without the exclusion of systematic propositional knowledge from knowing how and the resulting account does more justice to the practice of vocational education in advanced economies than does Ryle's original treatment.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Jeremy Fantl (2008). Knowing-How and Knowing-That. Philosophy Compass 3 (3):451–470.
Christopher Winch (2010). Vocational Education, Knowing How and Intelligence Concepts. Journal of Philosophy of Education 44 (4):551-567.
Leslie Marsh (2010). Ryle and Oakeshott on the “Knowing-How/Knowing-That” Distinction. In Corey Abel (ed.), The Meanings of Michael Oakeshott's Conservatism.
Paul Snowdon (2003). Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (1):1–29.
Paul Snowdon (2004). The Presidential Address: Knowing How and Knowing That: A Distinction Reconsidered. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104:1 - 29.
Eva-Maria Jung & Albert Newen (2010). Knowledge and Abilities: The Need for a New Understanding of Knowing-How. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (1):113-131.
Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson (2001). Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98 (8):411-444.
Refeng Tang (2011). Knowing That, Knowing How, and Knowing to Do. Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):426-442.
Christos Douskos (2013). The Linguistic Argument for Intellectualism. Synthese 190 (12):2325-2340.
Greg Sax (2010). Having Know-How: Intellect, Action, and Recent Work on Ryle's Distinction Between Knowledge-How and Knowledge-That. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):507-530.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads77 ( #12,781 of 722,826 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,541 of 722,826 )
How can I increase my downloads?