David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):295-316 (2010)
The paper proposes a minimal definition of dreaming in terms of immersive spatiotemporal hallucination (ISTH) occurring in sleep or during sleep–wake transitions and under the assumption of reportability. I take these conditions to be both necessary and sufficient for dreaming to arise. While empirical research results may, in the future, allow for an extension of the concept of dreaming beyond sleep and possibly even independently of reportability, ISTH is part of any possible extension of this definition and thus is a constitutive condition of dreaming. I also argue that the proposed ISTH model of dreaming, in conjunction with considerations on the epistemic relationship between dreaming and dream reports, raises important questions about the extent to which dreams typically involve a detailed body representation—an assumption that plays an important role in philosophical work on dreaming. As a commonly accepted definition of dreaming is lacking in current dream research, the ISTH model, which integrates conceptual analysis and epistemological considerations with results from empirical research, is an important contribution to this field. By linking dreaming to felt presence, full-body illusions, and autoscopic phenomena such as out-of-body experiences in wakefulness and in the hypnagogic state, the ISTH model of dreaming also helps integrate dream research, both theoretically and experimentally, with the study of other altered states of consciousness involving hallucinations. It makes straightforward and investigable predictions by claiming that all of these experiences have amodal spatiotemporal hallucinations as their common denominator. Finally, it is theoretically relevant for the philosophical discussion on minimal phenomenal selfhood.
|Keywords||Dreaming Hallucination Self-consciousness Bodily experience Altered states of consciousness Full-body illusions|
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Citations of this work BETA
Jennifer M. Windt & Valdas Noreika (2011). How to Integrate Dreaming Into a General Theory of Consciousness—A Critical Review of Existing Positions and Suggestions for Future Research. Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1091-1107.
Melanie Rosen & John Sutton (2013). Self‐Representation and Perspectives in Dreams. Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1041-1053.
Miguel Ángel Sebastián (2014). Dreams: An Empirical Way to Settle the Discussion Between Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Theories of Consciousness. Synthese 191 (2):263-285.
Jennifer Michelle Windt (2013). Minding the Dream Self: Perspectives From the Analysis of Self-Experience in Dreams. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (6):633.
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