Aristotle's theory of substance

Philosophical Review 111 (1):98-101 (2002)
Abstract
Aristotle's doctrines about accidental predication, Accidental identity, Etc., Can be understood as an attempt to state the same view as russell put forward in his theory of descriptions. "a" is predicated accidentally of b when "a to b" has the sense "something that is a is b." this permits scope distinctions which can solve puzzles like that of the masked man, And sophisms involving tense. Aristotle's claim that accidental being is akin to nonexistence resembles russell's account of the present king of france as a logical fiction
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