Beyond dual-process models: A categorisation of processes underlying intuitive judgement and decision making
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Thinking and Reasoning 16 (1):1-25 (2011)
Intuitive-automatic processes are crucial for making judgements and decisions. The fascinating complexity of these processes has attracted many decision researchers, prompting them to start investigating intuition empirically and to develop numerous models. Dual-process models assume a clear distinction between intuitive and deliberate processes but provide no further differentiation within both categories. We go beyond these models and argue that intuition is not a homogeneous concept, but a label used for different cognitive mechanisms. We suggest that these mechanisms have to be distinguished to allow for fruitful investigations of intuition. Specifically, we argue that researchers should concentrate on investigating the processes underlying intuition before making strong claims about its performance. We summarise current models for intuition and propose a categorisation according to the underlying cognitive processes: (a) associative intuition based on simple learning-retrieval processes, (b) matching intuition based on comparisons with prototypes/exemplars, (c) accumulative intuition based on automatic evidence accumulation, and (d) constructive intuition based on construction of mental representations. We discuss how this differentiation might help to clarify the relationship between affect and intuition and we derive a very general hypothesis as to when intuition will lead to good decisions and when it will go astray
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Citations of this work BETA
Helen De Cruz (2015). Where Philosophical Intuitions Come From. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):233-249.
Ben R. Newell & David R. Shanks (2014). Unconscious Influences on Decision Making: A Critical Review. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 38 (1):1-19.
Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2014). The Nature of Epistemic Feelings. Philosophical Psychology 27 (2):1-19.
Hanno Sauer (2012). Educated Intuitions. Automaticity and Rationality in Moral Judgement. Philosophical Explorations 15 (3):255-275.
Joshua Mugg (2015). The Dual-Process Turn: How Recent Defenses of Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning Fail. Philosophical Psychology 29 (2):300-309.
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