Functionalism and causal exclusion

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):198-215 (2003)
Abstract
Recent work by Jaegwon Kim and others suggest that functionalism leaves mental properties causally inefficacious in some sense. I examine three lines of argument for this conclusion. The first appeals to Occam's Razor; the second appeals to a ban on overdetermination; and the third charges that the kind of response I favor to these arguments forces me to give up "the homogeneity of mental and physical causation". I show how each argument fails. While I concede that a positive theory of mental causation is desirable, there is no reason to think that functionalism renders such a theory unattainable
Keywords Causation  Exclusion  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Overdetermination  Kim, J
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1993). Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press.
Anthony Dardis (1993). Sunburn: Independence Conditions on Causal Relevance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):577-598.

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Citations of this work BETA
Jeff Engelhardt (2014). Married Causes. Acta Analytica 29 (2):161-180.
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