Functionalism and causal exclusion

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):198-215 (2003)
Recent work by Jaegwon Kim and others suggest that functionalism leaves mental properties causally inefficacious in some sense. I examine three lines of argument for this conclusion. The first appeals to Occam's Razor; the second appeals to a ban on overdetermination; and the third charges that the kind of response I favor to these arguments forces me to give up "the homogeneity of mental and physical causation". I show how each argument fails. While I concede that a positive theory of mental causation is desirable, there is no reason to think that functionalism renders such a theory unattainable.
Keywords Causation  Exclusion  Functionalism  Metaphysics  Overdetermination  Kim, J
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DOI 10.1111/1468-0114.00170
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References found in this work BETA
Tyler Burge (1993). Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice. In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press
Tim Crane (1995). The Mental Causation Debate. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 69:211-36.

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