From metaphysics to ethics: A defence of conceptual analysis

Philosophical Review 109 (3):459-462 (2000)
Abstract
Conceptual analysis is currently out of favour, especially in North America. This is partly through misunderstanding of its nature. Properly understood, conceptual analysis is not a mysterious activity discredited by Quine that seeks after the a priori in some hard‐to‐understand sense. It is, rather, something familiar to everyone, philosophers and non‐philosophers alike—or so I argue. Another reason for its unpopularity is a failure to appreciate the need for conceptual analysis. The cost of repudiating it has not been sufficiently appreciated; without it, we cannot address a whole raft of important questions
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H. Lillehammer (1999). Review. From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):169-173.
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