Intrinsicality without naturalness

Abstract
Rae Langton and David Lewis have proposed an account of "intrinsic property" that makes use of two notions: being independent of accompaniment and being natural. We find the appeal to the first of these promising; the second notion, however, we find mystifying. In this paper we argue that the appeal to naturalness is not acceptable and offer an alternative definition of intrinsicality. The alternative definition makes crucial use of a notion commonly used by philosophers, namely, the notion of one property being had in virtue of another property. We defend our account against three arguments for thinking that this "in virtue of" notion is unacceptable in this context. We also take a look at a variety of cases in which the definition might be applied and defend it against potential counterexamples. The upshot, we think, is a modest but adequate account of what we understand by "intrinsic property."
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    References found in this work BETA
    Rae Langton & David Lewis (1998). Defining 'Intrinsic'. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):333-345.
    David Lewis (1983). New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (December):343-377.

    View all 9 references

    Citations of this work BETA
    Jessica M. Wilson (2010). What is Hume's Dictum, and Why Believe It? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595 - 637.
    Pekka Väyrynen (2009). Normative Appeals to the Natural. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):279 - 314.
    M. Eddon (2011). Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):314-336.
    Kelly Trogdon (2009). Physicalsim and Sparse Ontology. Philosophical Studies 143 (2):147-165.

    View all 6 citations

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    Alexander Skiles (2009). Trogdon on Monism and Intrinsicality. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):149 – 154.
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