Meinongian Metaphysics and Subjectivity

Abstract
Meinongian metaphysics uses “exists” as a genuine predicate, which entails that there are some objects that do not exist. The formal details of this position have been elucidated by several authors, but the question of how to explicate the predicate has received less attention. This paper examines Panayot Butchvarov’s thesis that existence is power, which is deduced from an argument that begins with the knowability of existent objects. It is argued that this account presupposes the thinking subject, and that when this presupposition is made explicit, it helps to clarify the deduction that Butchvarov uses, and has several other advantages with respect to Meinongian metaphysics
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