Searle, Burge and Intentional Content

In Johann Marek & Maria Reicher (eds.), Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society (2004)
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Maciej Witek
Uniwersytet Szczeciński

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Scepticism About Reflexive Intentions Refuted.Maciej Witek - 2009 - Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 5 (1):69-83.

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