Buck-passing and the right kind of reasons

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):114–120 (2006)
The ‘buck-passing’ account equates the value of an object with the existence of reasons to favour it. As we argued in an earlier paper, this analysis faces the ‘wrong kind of reasons’ problem: there may be reasons for pro-attitudes towards worthless objects, in particular if it is the pro-attitudes, rather than their objects, that are valuable. Jonas Olson has recently suggested how to resolve this difficulty: a reason to favour an object is of the right kind only if its formulation does not involve any reference to the attitudes for which it provides a reason. We argue that despite its merits, Olson's solution is unsatisfactory. We go on to suggest that the buck-passing account might be acceptable even if the problem in question turns out to be insoluble
Keywords fitting attitudes analysis of value  value  wrong kind of reasons  Olson, Jonas
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00432.x
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References found in this work BETA
Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.
I. L. Humberstone (1997). Two Types of Circularity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):249-280.
Rosanna Keefe (2002). When Does Circularity Matter? Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):253–270.

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Citations of this work BETA
Nathaniel Sharadin (2015). Reasons Wrong and Right. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (2):n/a-n/a.
Wlodek Rabinowicz (2009). Incommensurability and Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):71-94.
John Brunero (2013). Reasons as Explanations. Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.

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Jonas Olson (2004). Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons. Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215):295–300.

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