Graduate studies at Western
|Abstract||This paper looks at Timothy Williamson’s formulation of the thesis of Evidence Neutrality (EN). I motivate and argue for an upgraded version of EN by showing that changing one’s assumption about the nature of evidence (i.e. fallibility vs. factivity) generates a different verdict on EN. Then, I show how Williamson’s interpretation of EN is incomplete in light of a principle that guides his complete understanding of the nature of evidence. I reformulate EN to overcome deficiencies in Williamson’s interpretation of EN, and, lastly, I use cases from philosophy and science to show that reformulated‐EN promotes better practices in both domains while, at the same time, it avoids psychologizing evidence.|
|Keywords||Timothy Williamson Evidence|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|External links||This entry has no external links. Add one.|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
Similar books and articles
Aaron Rizzieri (2009). Evidence Does Not Equal Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):235-242.
Dylan Dodd (2007). Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):635–649.
Phyllis McKay Illari (2011). Mechanistic Evidence: Disambiguating the Russo–Williamson Thesis. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):139 - 157.
Clayton Littlejohn (2011). Evidence and Knowledge. Erkenntnis 74 (2):241-262.
Yuri Cath (2012). Evidence and Intuition. Episteme 9 (4):311-328.
Declan Smithies (2012). Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.
Added to index2009-10-13
Total downloads29 ( #48,129 of 739,328 )
Recent downloads (6 months)13 ( #9,207 of 739,328 )
How can I increase my downloads?