Agential Knowledge, Action and Process

Theoria 78 (4):326-357 (2012)
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Abstract

Claims concerning processes, claims of the form “x is φing”, have been the subject of renewed interest in recent years in the philosophy of action. However, this interest has frequently limited itself to noting certain formal features such claims have, and has not extended to a discussion of when they are true. This article argues that a claim of the form “x is φing” is true when what is happening with x is such that, if it is not interrupted, a φing will occur. It then applies itself more directly to the case of action, arguing that when “x is φing” describes x's intentional action, it is true iff x is acting from a method she knows to be sufficient to φ, in the sense that if she is not interrupted in carrying out this method, she will φ. I use this criterion to argue that the carbon-copier example Donald Davidson gives in “Intending” fails to refute Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that an agent who is φing intentionally knows that she is, because the agent in Davidson's example is not intentionally making the copies.

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Author's Profile

Ben Wolfson
Stanford University (PhD)

Citations of this work

Knowledge, practical knowledge, and intentional action.Joshua Shepherd & J. Adam Carter - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9:556-583.
The puzzle of learning by doing and the gradability of knowledge‐how.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):619-637.
Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Minds, Brains and Science.John R. Searle - 1984 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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