David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Oxford University Press (1990)
Philosophers typically see the issue of free will and determinism in terms of a debate between two standard positions. Incompatibilism holds that freedom and responsibility require causal and metaphysical independence from the impersonal forces of nature. According to compatibilism, people are free and responsible as long as their actions are governed by their desires. In Freedom Within Reason, Susan Wolf charts a path between these traditional positions: We are not free and responsible, she argues, for actions that are governed by desires that we cannot help having. But the wish to form our own desires from nothing is both futile and arbitrary. Some of the forces beyond our control are friends to freedom rather than enemies of it: they endow us with faculties of reason, perception, and imagination, and provide us with the data by which we come to see and appreciate the world for what it is. The independence we want, Wolf argues, is not independence from the world, but independence from forces that prevent or preclude us from choosing how to live in light of a sufficient appreciation of the world. The freedom we want is a freedom within reason and the world
|Keywords||Autonomy Free Will Reason Responsibility|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$3.75 used (94% off) $25.59 new (55% off) $56.00 direct from Amazon Amazon page|
|Call number||BJ1461.W64 1990|
|ISBN(s)||0195056167 0195085655 9780195085655|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner (2006). Is Incompatibilism Intuitive? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28 - 53.
Chandra Sekhar Sripada (2012). What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
Angela M. Smith (2008). Control, Responsibility, and Moral Assessment. Philosophical Studies 138 (3):367 - 392.
Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran (2007). Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mechanism: Experiments on Folk Intuitions. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.
Markus E. Schlosser (2014). The Neuroscientific Study of Free Will: A Diagnosis of the Controversy. Synthese 191 (2):245-262.
Similar books and articles
J. David Velleman (1989). Epistemic Freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):73-97.
Kevin Magill (1997). Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions. St. Martin's Press/Palgrave Macmillan.
Mary T. Clark (ed.) (1973). The Problem of Freedom. New York,Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Mark Leon (2000). Believing Autonomously. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:169-183.
Saul Smilansky (2005). Free Will and Respect for Persons. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):248-261.
R. F. Stalley (1998). Plato's Doctrine of Freedom. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):145–158.
Hilary Bok (1998). Freedom and Responsibility. Princeton University Press.
Matthew J. Kisner (2011). Spinoza on Human Freedom: Reason, Autonomy and the Good Life. Cambridge University Press.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads195 ( #6,822 of 1,725,465 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #93,199 of 1,725,465 )
How can I increase my downloads?