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  • Jan Woleński (1998). Mathematical Objects and Mathematical Knowledge. Erkenntnis 48 (1).
    Polish Philosophy in European Philosophy
    Ontology of Mathematics in Philosophy of Mathematics
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  • 64.4Otávio Bueno, Truth and Proof.
    Current versions of nominalism in the philosophy of mathematics face a significant problem to understand mathematical knowledge. They are unable to characterize mathematical knowledge as knowledge of the objects mathematical theories are taken to be about. Oswaldo Chateaubriand’s insightful reformulation of Platonism (Chateaubriand 2005) avoids this problem by advancing a broader conception of knowledge as justified truth beyond a reasonable doubt, and by introducing a suitable characterization of logical form in which the relevant mathematical facts play an important role in (...) the truth of the corresponding mathematical propositions. In this paper, I contrast Chateaubriand’s proposal with an agnostic form of nominalism that is able to accommodate mathematical knowledge without the commitment to mathematical facts. (shrink)
    Mathematical Nominalism in Philosophy of Mathematics
    Epistemology of Mathematics, Misc in Philosophy of Mathematics
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  • 63.9Andrej Krause (2008). Über Das Verhältnis Allgemeiner Und Individueller Materieller Und Mathematischer Gegenstände Nach Thomas Von Aquin. Vivarium 46 (2):155-174.
    This article examines one aspect of Thomas Aquinas' understanding of abstraction. It shows in which way, according to Aquinas, universal material objects and individual material objects are the starting point for mathematical objects. It comes to the conclusion that for Aquinas there are not only universal mathematical objects (circle, line), but also individual mathematical objects (this circle, that line). Universal mathematical objects are properties of universal material objects and individual mathematical objects are properties of individual material objects. One type of (...) abstractio formae leads from individual material objects to universal mathematical objects, a second type from universal material objects to universal mathematical objects, and a third type from individual material objects to individual mathematical objects. Therefore, the concept of abstractio formae is ambiguous. (shrink)
    Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
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  • 63.3Audrey Yap (2009). Logical Structuralism and Benacerraf's Problem. Synthese 171 (1).
    There are two general questions which many views in the philosophy of mathematics can be seen as addressing: what are mathematical objects, and how do we have knowledge of them? Naturally, the answers given to these questions are linked, since whatever account we give of how we have knowledge of mathematical objects surely has to take into account what sorts of things we claim they are; conversely, whatever account we give of the nature of mathematical objects must be accompanied by (...) a corresponding account of how it is that we acquire knowledge of those objects. The connection between these problems results in what is often called “Benacerraf’s Problem”, which is a dilemma that many philosophical views about mathematical objects face. It will be my goal here to present a view, attributed to Richard Dedekind, which approaches the initial questions in a different way than many other philosophical views do, and in doing so, avoids the dilemma given by Benacerraf’s problem. (shrink)
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  • 61.7Charles Parsons (2008). Mathematical Thought and its Objects. Cambridge University Press.
    In Mathematical Thought and Its Objects, Charles Parsons examines the notion of object, with the aim to navigate between nominalism, denying that distinctively mathematical objects exist, and forms of Platonism that postulate a transcendent realm of such objects. He introduces the central mathematical notion of structure and defends a version of the structuralist view of mathematical objects, according to which their existence is relative to a structure and they have no more of a “nature” than that confers on them.
    Philosophy of Mathematics
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  • 60.9Jessica Carter (2004). Ontology and Mathematical Practice. Philosophia Mathematica 12 (3).
    In this paper I propose a position in the ontology of mathematics which is inspired mainly by a case study in the mathematical discipline if-theory. The main theses of this position are that mathematical objects are introduced by mathematicians and that after mathematical objects have been introduced, they exist as objectively accessible abstract objects.
    Mathematical Platonism in Philosophy of Mathematics
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  • 60.0Timothy John Nulty (2005). A Critique of Resnik's Mathematical Realism. Erkenntnis 62 (3).
    This paper attempts to motivate skepticism about the reality of mathematical objects. The aim of the paper is not to provide a general critique of mathematical realism, but to demonstrate the insufficiency of the arguments advanced by Michael Resnik. I argue that Resnik’s use of the concept of immanent truth is inconsistent with the treatment of mathematical objects as ontologically and epistemically continuous with the objects posited by the natural sciences. In addition, Resnik’s structuralist program, and his denial of relational (...) properties, is incompatible with a realist metaphysics about mathematical objects. (shrink)
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