Needs, Desires and Moral Turpitude

Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures 8:162-179 (1974)
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Abstract

Need and Desire have obvious affinities. In this lecture I shall consider how they are to be distinguished, and how they may be confused: distinguished, that is, within philosophy, and confused in life itself. I shall then consider, very briefly, how this possibility of confusion bears upon morality and moral assessment

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References found in this work

Action, Emotion and Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Philosophy 39 (149):277-278.
The Analysis of Mind.Bertrand Russell - 1921/1922 - Mind 31 (121):85-97.
A Materialist Theory of the Mind.[author unknown] - 1968 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 27 (2):217-217.
Action, Emotion and Will.Keith S. Donnellan - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):526.

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