Paying People to Act in Their Own Interests: Incentives versus Rationalization in Public Health

Public Health Ethics 8 (1):27-30 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A number of schemes have been attempted, both in public health and more generally within social programmes, to pay individuals to behave in ways that are presumed to be good for them or to have other beneficial effects. Such schemes are normally regarded as providing a financial incentive for individuals in order to outweigh contrary motivation. Such schemes have been attacked on the basis that they can ‘crowd out’ intrinsic motivation, as well as on the grounds that they are in some sense ‘corrupt’. In response, they have been defended on the grounds that they can ‘crowd in’ improved motivation. I will argue that these debates have tended to overlook the difficulties individuals can have when attempting to behave against peer group norms. In some cases, financial payments can allow individuals to defend their actions on the grounds that ‘I am only doing it for the money’ in circumstances when it would be difficult to defend their action on their real motivations. Examples of paying children to read books, and paying women to give up smoking in pregnancy, will be discussed

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Public Health and Public Goods.Jonny Anomaly - 2011 - Public Health Ethics 4 (3):251-259.
Ethics, Prevention, and Public Health.Angus Dawson & Marcel Verweij (eds.) - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Why 'health' is not a central category for public health policy.Stephen John - 2009 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 26 (2):129-143.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-10-21

Downloads
63 (#246,899)

6 months
11 (#196,102)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Wolff
Oxford University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references