Graduate studies at Western
Acta Analytica 22 (3):207-222 (2007)
|Abstract||Causal theories of reference in the philosophy of language and philosophy of science have suggested that it could resolve lingering worries about incommensurability between theoretical claims in different paradigms, to borrow Kuhn’s terms. If we co-refer throughout different paradigms, then the problems of incommensurability are greatly diminished, according to causal theorists. I argue that assuring ourselves of that sort of constancy of reference will require comparable sorts of cross-paradigm affinities, and thus provides us with no special relief on this problem. Suggestions on how to think about rigid designation across paradigms are included.|
|Keywords||Reference Rigid designation Kuhn Putnam Incommesnurability|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Howard Sankey (1993). Kuhn's Changing Concept of Incommensurability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):759-774.
Arthur Sullivan (2007). Rigid Designation and Semantic Structure. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (6):1-22.
Howard Sankey (1997). Incommensurability: The Current State of Play. Theoria 12 (3):425-445.
Eric Oberheim & Paul Hoyningen-Huene (1997). Incommensurability, Realism, and Meta-Incommensurability. Theoria 12 (3):447-465.
Bradley Franks & Nick Braisby (1998). What is the Point? Concepts, Description, and Rigid Designation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):70-70.
Howard Sankey (1997). Incommensurability: The Current State of Play. Theoria 12 (3):425-45.
Alexander Bird (2004). Kuhn on Reference and Essence. Philosophia Scientiae 8:39-71.
Arthur Sullivan (2005). Rigid Designation, Direct Reference, and Modal Metaphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):577–599.
Michael P. Wolf (2006). Rigid Designation and Anaphoric Theories of Reference. Philosophical Studies 130 (2):351 - 375.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #51,760 of 739,537 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,464 of 739,537 )
How can I increase my downloads?