Philosophical Studies 130 (2):351 - 375 (2006)
|Abstract||Few philosophers today doubt the importance of some notion of rigid designation, as suggested by Kripke and Putnam for names and natural kind terms. At the very least, most of us want our theories to be compatible with the most plausible elements of that account. Anaphoric theories of reference have gained some attention lately, but little attention has been given to how they square with rigid designation. Although the differences between anaphoric theories and many interpretations of the New Theory of reference are substantial, I argue that rigid designation and anaphoric theories can be reconciled with one another and in fact complement one another in important ways.|
|Keywords||rigid designation anaphora Kripke Putnam Brandom|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Michael Devitt (2005). Rigid Application. Philosophical Studies 125 (2):139--165.
Iris Einheuser (2005). Two Types of Rigid Designation. Dialectica 59 (3):367–374.
Arthur Sullivan (2007). Rigid Designation and Semantic Structure. Philosophers' Imprint 7 (6):1-22.
Michael P. Wolf (2007). Reference and Incommensurability: What Rigid Designation Won't Get You. Acta Analytica 22 (3):207-222.
Bradley Franks & Nick Braisby (1998). What is the Point? Concepts, Description, and Rigid Designation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):70-70.
Arthur Sullivan (2005). Rigid Designation, Direct Reference, and Modal Metaphysics. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (4):577–599.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #45,856 of 549,671 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,425 of 549,671 )
How can I increase my downloads?