Rigid designation and anaphoric theories of reference

Philosophical Studies 130 (2):351 - 375 (2006)
Abstract
Few philosophers today doubt the importance of some notion of rigid designation, as suggested by Kripke and Putnam for names and natural kind terms. At the very least, most of us want our theories to be compatible with the most plausible elements of that account. Anaphoric theories of reference have gained some attention lately, but little attention has been given to how they square with rigid designation. Although the differences between anaphoric theories and many interpretations of the New Theory of reference are substantial, I argue that rigid designation and anaphoric theories can be reconciled with one another and in fact complement one another in important ways.
Keywords rigid designation  anaphora  Kripke  Putnam  Brandom
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References found in this work BETA
Robert Brandom (1984). Reference Explained Away. Journal of Philosophy 81 (9):469-492.
Michael Devitt (1981). Designation. Columbia University Press.

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