Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press (1987)
| Abstract | My strategy is to examine a recent trend in philosophical discussions of responsibility, a trend that tries, but I think ultimately fails, to give an acceptable analysis of the conditions of responsibility. It fails due to what at first appear to be deep and irresolvable metaphysical problems. It is here that I suggest that the condition of sanity comes to the rescue. What at first appears to be an impossible requirement for responsibility---the requirement that the responsible agent have created her- or himself---turns out to be the vastly more mundane and non controversial requirement that the responsible agent must, in a fairly standard sense, be sane. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Frankfurt Watson JoJo | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,672 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesKevin Timpe (2009). Causal History Matters, but Not for Individuation. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (1):77-91.
John J. Davenport (2002). Fischer and Ravizza on Moral Sanity and Weakness of Will. Journal of Ethics 6 (3):235–259.
Derk Pereboom (2002). Meaning in Life Without Free Will. Philosophic Exchange 33:19-34.
Bindu Madhok (2002). The Price of Frankfurt's Compatibilism. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:577-584.
Coleen Macnamara (2011). Holding Others Responsible. Philosophical Studies 152 (1):81-102.
Ishtiyaque Haji (1999). Indeterminism and Frankfurt-Type Examples. Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (2003). Identification and Responsibility. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):349-376.
Phillip D. Gosselin (1979). Is There a Freedom Requirement for Moral Responsibility? Dialogue 18 (03):289-306.
David Faraci & David Shoemaker (2010). Insanity, Deep Selves, and Moral Responsibility: The Case of JoJo. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3): 319-332.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2010-01-22Total downloads551 ( #80 of 549,069 )Recent downloads (6 months)40 ( #843 of 549,069 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
