David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In Ferdinand David Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology. Cambridge University Press. 46-62 (1987)
My strategy is to examine a recent trend in philosophical discussions of responsibility, a trend that tries, but I think ultimately fails, to give an acceptable analysis of the conditions of responsibility. It fails due to what at first appear to be deep and irresolvable metaphysical problems. It is here that I suggest that the condition of sanity comes to the rescue. What at first appears to be an impossible requirement for responsibility---the requirement that the responsible agent have created her- or himself---turns out to be the vastly more mundane and non controversial requirement that the responsible agent must, in a fairly standard sense, be sane.
|Keywords||Frankfurt Watson JoJo|
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Michael McKenna (2012). Moral Responsibility, Manipulation Arguments, and History: Assessing the Resilience of Nonhistorical Compatibilism. [REVIEW] Journal of Ethics 16 (2):145-174.
Craig Ross (2011). Dennett on Free Will. Metaphysica 12 (2):137-149.
Matthias Steup (2008). Doxastic Freedom. Synthese 161 (3):375-392.
Martin James Evenden (2012). Critical Realism in the Personal Domain: Spinoza and Explanatory Critique of the Emotions. Journal of Critical Realism 11 (2):163-187.
Richard Double (1992). How Rational Must Free Will Be? Metaphilosophy 23 (3):268-78.
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